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ABSTRACT
The abuses at Abu Ghraib, an American-run prison in Iraq, raise the question, how does
torture happen in a society whose members for the most part believe that doing harm to
others is wrong? Ronald Crelinsten (2003) offers the explanation that people create an
alternate reality in which torture is justified. Three types of people, perpetrators, victims,
and bystanders, participate in the maintenance of this alternate reality. My study is an
instantiation of Crelinsten's framework. It focuses on the perpetrators at Abu Ghraib. I
propose that two types of perpetrators participated in the abuses: the soldiers and
personnel in the U.S. government bureaucracy. Although we cannot truly know whether
or not an alternate reality existed, we can examine public definitions of the nature of the
enemy made by government officials that suggest current international protocols of war
do not apply to the enemy. By recognizing the definitions offered that could result in the
creation of an alternate reality which includes torture, we can learn how to prevent its
construction.

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Introduction .................................................................................................1
Orgrutization of Thesis ..................................................................... 1

II.

Methodology ................................................................................................3
Data ..................................................................................................3

Limitations of Official Documents ........................................-..........4
Definition of Terms..........................................................................6
III.

History: The Road to Abu Ghraib ...............................................................7
A New Kind of War ........................................................................7
Afghrutistan ......................................................................................8

Guantanamo Bay ............................................................................ 10
Preemptive War on Iraq ................................................................. 13
Policies for Interrogations .............................................................. 14
Abuses ............................................................................................ 16
Military Protocol and Procedural Guidelines for Interrogations ...21
Under Siege at Abu Ghraib: Reasons Why ....................................22
IV.

Theoretical Framework .............................................................................25
Foundational Theories ...................................................................25
My Contribution.............................................................................26
The Creation of an Alternate Reality .............................................27
Three Processes of an Alternate Reality ........................................28
Authorization .......................................................................28
Routinization ........................................................................29
V

Dehumanization ...................................................................30
Alternate Realities in an Open Society ..........................................32
Three Roles in the Use of Torture ................................................. .33
Foreground and Background: The Conditions for Sharing an
Alternate Reality ............................................................................34
Foreground: The Conditions for the Soldiers' Alternate
Reality ............................................................................................34
Background: The Conditions for the Bureaucracy's Alternate

Reality ............................................................................................35
V.

Analysis ......................................................................................................37
lntroduction .....................................................................................37
Foreground: The Soldiers as Perpetrators ......................................37
Authorization .......................................................................3 7
Routinization ........................................................................3 9
Dehumanization ...................................................................41
Background: The Bureaucracy as Perpetrators .............................43
Authorization ....................................................................... 43
Routinization ........................................................................50
Dehumanization ...................................................................52

VI.

Conclusion ................................................................................................53
Discussion ......................................................................................53
Critique ..........................................................................................54
A Proposal for Future Research .....................................................55
vi

References ..............................................................................................................57

Vita.........................................................................................................................63

Vll

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Interrogation Techniques Approved for Guantanamo Bay .....................44
Table 2: Interrogation Techniques Approved for Afghanistan ..............................46
Table 3: Interrogation Techniques Approved for Iraq (Including Abu Ghraib) ....48

viii

I. INTRODUCTION
During the "War on Terror" and the preemptive war against Iraq in 2003 and
2004, American soldiers abused detainees held in Abu Ghraib prison located near
Baghdad. After several independent investigations by the U.S. government, investigators
found a pattern of abuse against detainees prior to Abu Ghraib. Abuses also occurred at
Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan, both sites used to hold detainees from the so-called
"War on Terror." The abuses at Abu Ghraib caught the public's attention after
photographs taken of soldiers posing with the abused detainees were broadcast on the
national television news program, 60 Minutes II. Two days later, journalist Seymour
Hersh (2004a) printed a story in The New Yorker outlining the specific abuses against
these detainees and also displaying the same pictures shown on 60 Minutes II.
The abuses at Abu Ghraib raise sociological questions of why such harmful
behavior might be perpetrated and allowed to continue. Ronald Crelinsten (2003)
addresses these questions on a general level. He explains that people involved in torture,
the perpetrators, the victims, and the bystanders, all participate in the shared construction
of realities. Although torturous behavior may not be directly condoned, it is allowed to
continue by inaction. Crelinsten's (2003) framework explains both action and inaction
with the notion of alternate realities.
Organization of Thesis

In Section II of this thesis, following this introduction, I describe my methodology
and data. The data are extensive due to the current nature of the A]?u Ghraib abuses as
well as public interest in it. Even a year after the story first broke, "Abu Ghraib" is still
appearing in the media on a regular basis. The amount of information is not only large,
I

but the data are also being continually updated because at the time of this writing,
investigations are still ongoing.
Section III lays out what happened at Abu Ghraib. I provide a history of both
Abu Ghraib and related events in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. In the same
section, I describe the abuses inflicted on the detainees by the U.S. military. I review
military protocol and procedural guidelines for interrogations. Finally, I consider the
speculations of James Schlesinger and Major General George Fay (2004) on why the
abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred.
Section IV provides the theoretical framework that I applied to the events at Abu
Ghraib. This section summarizes Ronald Crelinsten's (2003) model of why torture
occurs in a "humane" society. Crelinsten (2003) explains that people create alternate
realities that neutralize the use of torture, either by condoning the behavior or by inaction
and ambivalence. In addition to Crelinsten's framework, I briefly detail other
sociological theories that parallel Crelinsten's (2003) work.
Section V offers my analysis. I apply Crelinsten's framework to the events at
Abu Ghraib and examine the conditions conducive to the creation of an alternate reality.
Finally, Section VI follows with a discussion and a proposal for future research in the
area of torture and the creation of alternate realities.
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II. METHODOLOGY
Data
Because the abuses at Abu Ghraib have been covered in the media since April
2004, a vast amount of literatur� on the topic exists, ranging from news reports to
government documents to editorial opinions. Yet, the empirical ground of the events at
Abu Ghraib is still shifting. More reports are generated every day due to the ongoing
investigation of the events at Abu Ghraib. Since new reports continue to appear, I have
chosen to limit my data to only those reports issued from September 11, 2001 through
April 14, 2005. The beginning date is significant because it marks the events of the
terrorist attacks of 9-11 (to be discussed in further detail in the section entitled
"Afghanistan"). These events are crucial for understanding the context leading up to the
military presence at Abu Ghraib.
My investigation relies heavily on secondary analysis of government documents,
including the Pentagon's investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and select
unofficial sources. I chose secondary analysis because the U.S. government already
collected and compiled the data within the Pentagon's investigations. I use the
government reports on those investigations to instantiate Crelinsten's (2003) theory.
The government documents are comprehensive sources recounting the abuses at
Abu Ghraib and the protocols in place on �e treatment of prisoners, as reported in
interviews. Two important government sources are the report of the Independent Panel
chaired by Former Defense Secretary and Advisory Counsel Member James Schlesinger,
and the report of the Pentagon chaired by Major General George Fay (Strasser, 2004). I
reference the Pentagon's investigation to lay out the groundwork of what occurred
3

leading up to and during the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The Torture Papers by Karen J.
Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (2005) and Seymour Hersh's The Chain of Command
(2004) are two unofficial sources that corroborate, in thoroughness and focus, on the Abu
Ghraib (as opposed to other) abuses, the official documents. Greenberg and Dratel's
(2005) book is a compilation of the declassified memos written by the Bush
Administration leading up to and during the abuses at Abu Ghraib. I used Greenberg and
Dratel's compilation of memos to place the events leading up to and at Abu Ghraib in
historical context. To present the data in as efficient and organized fashion as possible, I
present the memos in chronological order. When I quote military personnel, or those
associated closely with them, and members of the bureaucratic administration, I use both
the Pentagon's reports and media sources, such as newspaper or television interviews. I
also reference MSNBC's reports on some of the statements released by the detainees at
Abu Ghraib as well as pictures of the abused detainees at Abu Ghraib taken by the
soldiers who participated in the abuses. I use both government and non-government
reports to corroborate the abuses and their institutional contexts.
Limitations of Official Documents

Significant limitations exist when using official documents for a historical
analysis. The researcher conducting a project on a current event involving the
government faces methodological and epistemological problems. First, a researcher can
only use what is declassified. All of the documents surrounding Abu Ghraib were not
declassified by the end of my research period, April 1 4, 2005, and therefore could not be
used for my thesis.
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A second limitation in using official documents, specifically memoranda, is that
there is no way to know what occurs between the times that a memo is drafted and when
it is actually sent. Understanding what happens between the times that a memo is written
and the time that the same memo is sent may indicate the urgency and accuracy of a
memo (Wood, 2004). For example, ifl drafted a memo on the progress ofmy thesis, but
did not send it for a substantial period oftime, a person might assume either (1) the
progress ofmy thesis has likely changed since I first drafted the memo and/or (2) the
memo was not extremely urgent in the first place. Acknowledging this limitation, I have
chosen to present the documents according to the date given on the memo. There is also
no way to know in what manner the memo was viewed. Was it posted on a bulletin
board that most people ignored? Did government advisors read it around the water cooler
and joke about it? Was it presented in a formal meeting? A researcher typically cannot
account for the context in which an official document was presented, thus creating a gap
in the interpretation of the context ofthat document (Wood, 2004).
A third limitation, one that is related to my point about classified documents, is
more critical. Governments lie-both by telling untruths and by failing to disclose truths.
For example, consider the investigation into two detainee deaths in Afghanistan during
2002 (Golden, 2005). Army investigators had autopsy reports stating that the cause of
death for both detainees was "blunt force trauma." In addition, several soldier accounts
stated that these two detainees died after being hit by American military guards.
Nonetheless, the Army investigators still wanted to close the case without filing any
criminal charges. Although eventually further investigations charged seven soldiers, the
investigation took two years to complete (Golden, 2005).
5

Another example of this limitation concerns St. Louis Cardinals' football player
Pat Tillman. Tillman served as an Army Ranger and was killed in Afghanistan on April
22, 2004. Initial press releases and statements given by Army officials stated that
Tillman was killed by members of the Taliban while charging up a hill. A few weeks
after his nationally televised funeral, Commanding General of U.S. Army Special
Operations, Philip Kensinger, announced that an investigation determined that Tillman
was actually killed by friendly fire. The results of this investigation were made available
to officials shortly after Tillman's death and before his memorial service on May 3, 2004.
The army waited to publicly announce that Tillman had been killed by friendly fire until
May 29, 2004 (Jackson, 2005). In both of these examples, it is clear that the government
lies by telling untruths and by not disclosing information. Recognizing this limitation,
my solution is the corroboration of sources.
Definition of Terms
To establish clarity when using particular terminology in my thesis, the definition
of specific terms is necessary. I use the term abuses to refer to any behavior-physical,
emotional or verbal-in violation of the Geneva Conventions and military protocol.

When I refer to bureaucracy, I am referring to the military leaders associated with the
abuses at Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib, as well as the executive
branch from 2001 through 2005. Finally, the term accountability in my thesis signifies
the oversight of most or all individual action by others and particularly by supervisors.
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III. HISTORY: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB
A New Kind of War
The attacks by Al Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001 prompted U.S.
President George W. Bush to declare ''war" on Afghanistan, where most members of the
Al Qaeda network presumably lived. The military action against Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan was more an armed attack supported by the idea that the terrorists were
hiding out there. He declared this action as a "War on Terror," thus claiming to be
fighting a faceless enemy. Given that the enemy of the "War on Terror" was purportedly
unlike any enemy that the current administration, or any prior administration, had faced,
the Department of Defense allegedly had to reevaluate the policies established to deal
with enemies during wartime.
Interrogation techniques are often used during wartime to gain more intelligence
on the enemy (Field Manual 34-52, 1992). The techniques of interrogation outlined as
part of the "War' on Terror" were used in both Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 1 and Afghanistan.
Afghanistan was the main theater for the "War on Terror," and Guantanamo Bay served
as the holding site for prisoners from the "War on Terror." Similar techniques were used
at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, Iraq. Some of these techniques were of an
elaborate and degrading physical and even sexual nature. Their publication through
videotaping and photographing met with mass disapproval on a global scale. The
historical background that follows provides the foundation for an analysis of how such

1

Prisoners captured as part of the War on Terror in Afghanistan were detained at a military base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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torture is made possible when committed against a group labeled as an enemy
(Crelinsten, 2003).
Afghanistan
On Tuesday, September 1 1 , 2001 , two hijacked commercial airplanes flew into
the Twin Towers at the World Trade Center in New York. One plane hit the north tower
at 8:45 a;m. and the second plane hit the south tower at 9:02 a.m. Shortly after, at 9:40
a.m., another hijacked plane hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. At 9:58 a.m. the north
tower of the World Trade Center collapsed followed by the south tower at 1 0:28 a.m.
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Another plane was supposed to
attack the White House but the passengers over-powered the hijackers and the attempt
was thwarted. In this instance, all of the passengers were killed when the plane crashed
in a field in Pennsylvania. The death toll of all the attacks of September 1 1 th , 2001 is
estimated to have exceeded three thousand.
Although no one took responsibility immediately after the attacks, the American
government soon identified an attacker. President Bush addressed the nation on
September 20, 2001, stating, "The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of
loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda" (Bush, 2001 ). He explained,
"The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban
regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's vision for
the world" (Bush, 2001 ).
In the weeks following the September 1 1 attacks, President George W. Bush and
his advisors drafted reports to send to Congress on retaliation against the perpetrators of
the attacks and their supporters. On September 1 8, 2001 , Congress nearly unanimously
8

accepted the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban,
an Afghani political party supportive of Al-Qaeda. U.S. intelligence indicated that
Afghanistan housed both terrorist groups and that Al Qaeda and the Taliban were both
considered prominent within the Afghani government (Schlesinger, 2004). On October
7, 2001, the "War on Terror" began (Cirillo and Ricchiardi, 2004). The United States
initiated hostilities and captured the first detainees shortly thereafter in November 2001
(Schlesinger, 2004).
The U.S. government was allegedly engaging in a war unlike any other in its
history. Hence, in a September 20, 2001 address to our nation, President Bush stated,
"Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans
should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever
seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even
in success" (2001 ). The novelty of this war extended to treatment of prisoners. On the
advice of some of his advisors, on February 7, 2002, President Bush released a memo
declaring that the Geneva Conventions were not applicable to the conflict with Al-Qaeda
(Schlesinger, 2004). The memo explained that the Geneva Conventions did apply to
Afghanistan civilians but that members of the Taliban were actually "unlawful
combatants" and therefore should not receive the treatment outlined for prisoners of war
according to the Geneva Conventions (Schlesinger, 2004). Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, all
disagreed with the President's memo and stated that the treatment of detainees should
follow those outlined by the Geneva Conventions regardless of their membership in Al
Qaeda or terrorism (Schlesinger, 2004).
9

Guantanamo Bay
On Oc�ober 1 1 , 2002, military officials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba requested
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld' s authorization of stronger interrogation techniques. On
December 2, 2002, Rumsfeld responded with the authorization of 1 6 additional stronger
interrogation techniques (Schlesinger, 2004). Rumsfeld and his advisors classified these
techniques into two types: Category II and Category 1112 • Schlesinger (2004) reported:
Reacting to tenacious resistance by some detainees to existing
interrogation methods, which were essentially limited to those in Army
Field Manual 34-52, Guantanamo authorities in October 2002 requested
approval of strengthened counter-interrogation techniques to increase
intelligence yield from interrogations. This request was accompanied by a
recommended tiered list of techniques, with the proviso that harsher
Category III methods could be used only on "exceptionally resistant
detainees" and with the approval by higher headquarters (Schlesinger,
2004:31 ).
Category II interrogation techniques were outlined by Jerald Phifer, advisor to Rumsfeld,
as follows:
(1 ) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four
hours.
(2) The use of falsified documents or reports.
(3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made
through the OIC [Officer In Charge], Interrogation Section, to the
Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial
30 days must be approved by Commanding General. For selected
detainees, the OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with
the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature.
(4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard
interrogation booth.
(5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
( 6) The detainee may also have a hood placed over his head during
transportation and questioning. The hood shall not restrict breathing in
2 Category I techniques w�re conceived as the mildest form of interrogation techniques. They include
yelling and some minor forms of deception. Category I techniques could be used at will with detainees.
Category II and Category III techniques are stronger interrogation techniques and required the approval of
commanding officers (Schlesinger, 2004).

10

any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when
hooded.
(7) The use of 20-hour interrogations.
(8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).
(9) Switching the detainees from hot rations to MREs.
(1 0) Removal of clothing.
(1 1 ) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.).
(1 2) Using detainees' individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce
stress (Phifer, October 1 1 , 2002:2).·
Phifer stated that the recommendation of additional techniques not identified as Category
II and Category III techniques could be submitted to Rumsfeld along with the safeguards
the interrogator intended to use to ensure the detainee's right guaranteed by the Geneva
Conventions and the rationale for using such techniques. Phifer also commented,
"Nothing in this memorandum in any way restricts your existing authority to maintain
good order and discipline among detainees" (2002: 1 ).
On January 15, 2003, Rumsfeld rescinded authorization of the use of all Category
II techniques and one Category III technique on the advice of the Navy General Counsel.
The one Category III technique rescinded was "The use of mild, non-injurious physical
contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing" (Haynes,
November 27, 2002:1). Additional Category III techniques not rescinded included
threatening the detainees with death for themselves and/or their families as well as the
use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the perception of suffocation for the
detainee (Phifer, October 1 1 , 2002:2). In his January 1 5, 2003 memo Rumsfeld also
stated that the remaining Category II and III interrogation techniques that were not
rescinded must only be used with his express consent (Rumsfeld, 2003). In the same
memo, Rumsfeld added, "In all interrogations, you should continue the humane treatment
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of detainees, regardless of the type of interrogation technique employed" (Rumsfeld,
January 15, 2003: 1 ).
Later in January 2003, Rumsfeld convened a new committee referred to as the
Working Group, to examine interrogation techniques. Air Force General Counsel Mary
Walker was appointed as chair. The Working Group involved members from both
military and intelligence organizations as well as lawyers from the Office of Legal
Counsel (Schlesinger, 2004). The Working Group evaluated 35 interrogation techniques
and ultimately presented 24 to Rumsfeld as legitimate (Schlesinger, 2004). The
recommendation of the 24 interrogation techniques by the Working Group apparently led
directly to Rumsfeld's memo dated April 1 6, 2003, in which he listed 25 interrogation
techniques that were stronger than had been used before, to be used only at Guantanamo
Bay. These supplemented the ones Rumsfeld had approved in January. These included
sleep deprivation, isolation, the silent treatment, false flag (give the detainees the false
impression that members of another country are interrogating them), environmental
manipulation (altering the detainees' environment to make them uncomfortable, like
drastically changing the temperature or bringing a repulsive smell into the room), and

"fear up harsh" (considerably raising the fear level of a detainee) (Rumsfeld, April 1 6,
2003). Rumsfeld stated, "I reiterate that U.S. Armed Forces shall continue to treat
detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity,
in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions" (Rumsfeld, April
1 6, 2003:1 ). The policies established by Rumsfeld in April 2003, based on the Working
Group's recommendations, remained ground protocol at Guantanamo Bay (Schlesinger,
2004).
12

Preemptive War on Iraq
On March 1 9, 2003, the United States declared a preemptive war against Iraq.
Iraq had been an undemocratic nation led by the dictator Saddam Hussein. Hussein had
allegedly oppressed his own people as well as those of surrounding countries, such as
Kuwait and Iran (U.S. Department of State, 2004). Hussein and his administration,
primarily comprised of his family, were also alleged to be producing and harboring
weapons of mass destruction. The supposed production and housing of weapons of mass
destruction was a concern to the United States because Bush's Administration believed
that Hussein's hatred for the United States could provoke him to ally with Al Qaeda and
the Taliban and supply them with these weapons of mass destruction. Hussein denied the
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. When asked by the United States to
disclose the whereabouts of these weapons, Hussein refused. The United Nations also
sent weapons inspectors to Iraq to attempt to find the alleged nuclear weapons. After
multiple "negotiations" with the United Nations, during which Saddam Hussein refused
to disclose the location(s) of the weapons, the United States declared war on Iraq. 3 In his
speech addressing the nation on the eve of war, President Bush said, "In this conflict,
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality"
(Bush, 2003).

Shortly following the declaration of a preemptive war, the military forces

began to imprison Iraqi insurgents at Abu Ghraib.
During the reign of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, located just outside of
Baghdad, gained a reputation as one of the world's most horrific prisons. The reputation
was earned by the despicable living conditions, weekly executions and torture that
3

The United Nations opposed a war against I�aq (United Nations, 2003).
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occurred at Abu Ghraib prison. Some sources claim that over fifty thousand prisoners,
both men and women, were held at Abu Ghraib at any one time. Following the fall of
Hussein's regime in April 2003, Abu Ghraib was completely looted. Anything that could
be removed was. The Coalition forces, including American, British and Australian
troops, remodeled the prison, adding a new medical facility, toilets, showers, and tiles for
the floors. With these renovations, Abu Ghraib was turned into a U.S. military prison
(Hersh, 2004)�
As early as October 2003, the prisoners held at Abu Ghraib by Coalition forces
numbered approximately seven thousand (Schlesinger, 2004). Coalition forces
categorized them into three groups: "common criminals; security detainees suspected of
'crimes against the Coalition'; and a small number of suspected 'high-value' leaders of
the insurgency against the Coalition forces" (Hersh, 2004:21).
Policies/or Interrogations
In August 2003, the Joint Staff appointed Major General Geoffrey Miller to visit
the detainee facilities in Iraq and meet with Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), the
military com�and post in Iraq, to discuss the intelligence gained from the detainees being
interrogated. The aim of Miller's trip to Iraq was to evaluate interrogation policies in
place with the intent of revising them (Schlesinger, 2004). Miller brought the list of
interrogation techniques drafted by Rumsfeld on April 1 6, 2003. This list was to be used
as a baseline for policies at Abu Ghraib. Miller showed it to Lieutenant General Ricardo
Sanchez, the commander of CJTF-7. Recall that these techniques were to be used only at
Guantanamo Bay (Schlesinger, 2004). When evaluating the facilities at Abu Ghraib,
Miller reportedly suggested that stronger techniques should be used, and that policies
14

should be made as uniform as possible throughout Iraq. At this point, the standards for
interrogation procedures were not widely known, even to the soldiers involved in the
interrogation process. As a response to Miller's suggestions and a request from the 51 9th
Military Intelligence Battalion (the battalion deployed from Afghanistan to Abu Ghraib)
for written guidelines for appropriate interrogation procedures, Sanchez issued a memo
including the authorization of 12 additional techniques. The additional techniques were
not included in Manual 34-52 but were suggested by Sanchez and his advisors
(Schlesinger, 2004).
Even though Miller established that the techniques listed in Rumsfeld's April 1 6th
memo were approved only for use at Guantanamo Bay, Sanchez reasoned in a report that ·
the detainees held at Abu Ghraib were also "unlawful combatants" and thus that these
techniques were appropriate (Schlesinger, 2004). Sanchez assumed he held the power to
authorize such aggressive procedures as well as to categorize the detainees as unlawful
combatants (Schlesinger, 2004). Schlesinger (2004) reported, "The CJTF-7 Commander
[Sanchez], on the advice of his Staff Judge Advocate, believed he had the inherent
authority of the Commander in a Theater of War to promulgate such a policy and make ·
determinations as to the categorization of detainees under the Geneva Conventions," (pp.
8-9). Central Command, also referred to as CENTCOM, was the central command
committee housed in Iraq. CENTCOM disagreed with Sanchez's view of his authority
and referred to his procedures as overtly aggressive. In response, Sanchez withdrew the
additional techniques of interrogation and authorized methods only mildly stronger than
those listed in Manual 34-52 (Schlesinger, 2004 ).
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Abuses
At the time of the Official Reports ofthe Independent Panel and the Pentagon,
155 investigations had been completed on the approximately 300 alleged incidents of
abuse against prisoners at the Joint Operations Areas, which included Afghanistan,
Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib. Sixty-six of the 155 investigations confirmed that
U.S. forces had in fact abused detainees. Of the 66 confirmed investigations into the
abuses, the Pentagon substantiated eight at Guantanamo Bay, three in Afghanistan and 55
in Iraq at Abu Ghraib. Approximately one third of the alleged cases of abuses at the Joint
Operations Areas occurred during interrogations (Schlesinger, 2004). There were five
substantiated accounts of detainee death during interrogation, while 23 detainee deaths
are under investigation at the time of this writing. 4
In December 2003, the first commanding female officer in Iraq was appointed to
office at Abu Ghraib, Army Reserve Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who had no prior
experience in supervising a prison. After the Pentagon received a report that addressed
the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib in January 2004, Karpinski was formally
reprimanded and suspended from her post only a month after her initial deployment there.
At approximately the same time, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez ordered an
investigation on the reports of abuse at Abu Ghraib by the 372nd Military Police
Company and 320th Military Police Battalion. Lieutenant General Sanchez appointed
Major General Antonio M. Taguba to head up the investigation (Hersh, 2004). In his
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Twenty of the 23 detainee deaths occurred in Iraq while the other three cases occurred in Afghanistan
(Schlesinger, 2004).
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report, Taguba recounted some ofthe abusive behavior occurring at Abu Ghraib by the
Military Police (MP). His list is as follows:
a. Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;
b. Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
c. Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for
photographing;
d. Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for
several days at a time;
e. Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;
f. Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being
photographed and videotaped;
g. Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;
h. Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his
head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric
torture;
i. Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have
forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him
naked;
j. Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee' s neck and having
a female Soldier pose for a picture;
k. A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
1. Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and
frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a
detainee;
m. Taking photographs ofdead Iraqi detainees (Taguba, 2004:16).
Major General George R. Fay's investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib classified the
abuses inflicted at Abu Ghraib into four groups: physical abuse which included the use of
dogs; humiliating and degrading treatments which included nakedness, photographs,
simulated sexual positions, and improper use ofisolation; failure to safeguard detainees;
and failure to report detainee abuse (Fay, 2004).
The general physical abuse against detainees included slapping and kicking
detainees, twisting the hands of a detainee while in handcuffs, and throwing balls at
detainees. The Fay report also recounted an incident where a soldier held a hand over the
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nose and mouth of a detainee to stop breatping. All of these incidents are in violation of
interrogation procedural guidelines is�ued for Abu Ghraib by Rumsfeld and those
outlined in Field Manual 34-52 (2004).
Another type of physical abuse that the Fay report addressed was the use of dogs.
The use ofdogs is a common form ofsecurity for military prisons. The use ofdogs,
however, to threaten or intimidate detainees is a direct violation ofmilitary prison
guidelines. The report mentioned an incident at Abu Ghraib where two Army dog
handlers used dogs to intimidate two detainees to see which one urinated and defecated
first. Another instance was when two Army dogs were let loose in a cell with two
juvenile detainees. The detainees were terrified and attempted to hide behind each other
(Fay, 2004).
The physical abuse also turned sexual in several instances. For example, these
abuses included forced participation in group masturbation and the rape of a detainee by
an American translator (Fay 2004).
A second type of abuse was humiliating and degrading treatment. The Fay report
stated that any attempt to humiliate or degrade a detainee is a direct violation of Geneva
Conventions IV, Field Manual 34-52, the additional techniques approved by Rumsfeld
and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Three types of humiliation and degrading
treatment were identified by this report: nakedness, photographs and simulated sexual
positions. Removal of detainees' clothing wa� apparently a common, or at least not
uncolll!11on, practice at Abu Ghraib (Fay 2004). Most accounts indicated that the
removal ofdetainees' clothing was a form of punishment for insubordination against
interrogators or MPs. Additionally; female soldiers were present with naked male
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detainees. Soldiers who reported this practice were informed that it was common
procedure even though it was in direct violation of approved guidelines for holding
detainees (Fay, 2004). Photographing.detainees in humiliating positions was another,
ultimately notorious, form of degrading treatment. In several instances, detainees were
posed in simulated sexual positions with other detainees and photographed.
Another type of humiliating and degrading treatment used at Abu Ghraib was the
unsanctioned use of isolation. Isolation is a common interrogation procedure, nominally
designed to keep detainees from telling each other about interrogation techniques or
sharing sensitive information with each other (Fay 2004). The Geneva Conventions IV
stated that isolation should only be employed to maintain military security, but not as a
form of punishment. Isolation was frequently used as a control technique or punishment
at Abu Ghraib and therefore violated military protocol as established in Field Manual 3452 and the UCMJ as well as the Geneva Conventions (Fay 2004).
A third type of abuse found at Abu Ghraib was the failure to safeguard detainees.
Detainees at any military prison have the right according to the Geneva Conventions and
Army Regulations to be "protected against all acts of violence and threats thereof and
against insults and public curiosity" (Fay, 2004: 114).
The fourth and final type of abuse at Abu Ghraib, according to Fay, was the
failure to report detainee abuse. Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) states, "[when a soldier or other military official] violates or fails to obey any
lawful general order or regulation; having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by
any member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or is
derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct"
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(UCMJ, 2005). Not only could failure to report detainee abuse result in dereliction of
duty for soldiers, but for contracted interrogators as well because all are bound by the
Geneva Conventions (Fay, 2004).
Fay's report also addressed other problems at Abu Ghraib that were not as easily
categorized � specific abuses. The lack of cooperation and communication between the
Military Police and Military Intelligence soldiers created problems in guarding the
detainees. For example, the MPs were responsible for detainees' clothing; however, MI
soldiers began as early as September 16, 2003, to institute nudity as an interrogation
tactic. When the issue of the detainees' clothing was questioned, the answer commonly
given was that there was a shortage of supply clothing. Fay (2004) reported, "Removal
of clothing and nakedness were being used to humiliate detainees at the same time there
was a general level of confusion as to what was allowable in terms of MP disciplinary
measures and MI interrogations rules, and what clothing was available" (p. 1 15).
Until April 28, 2004, when CBS's Sixty Minutes II aired a story about abuses
against detainees, the military's actions at Abu Ghraib had been able to keep the abuses a
"family matter" and out of the living rooms of the public. The pictures used on this
episode of Sixty Minutes II depicted American soldiers with Iraqi prisoners posed in
humiliating sexual positions. Intelligence journalist Seymour Hersh had also obtained the
pictures as well as the Taguba report, which CBS did not have as of its broadcast. Hersh
also learned that CBS had held off airing the story at the request of the Pentagon. The
story finally aired on April 28, 2004. Two days later, Hersh's article profiling the abuses
and displaying some of the pictures was printed in The New Yorker. Within months, the
U.S. government organized multiple investigations into the abuse at Abu Ghraib, two of
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which were the Official Reports ofthe Independent Panel and the Pentagon by
Schlesinger and Fay (Hersh, 2004).
Military Protocol and Procedural Guidelines for Interrogations
A number of official protocols - national and international - guided the
interrogation practices used at Abu Ghraib. In the summer of2002, President Bush
requested specific standards ofinterrogation techniques that would be in accordance with
the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Torture (Schlesinger, 2004). The UN
Convention Against Torture was created on July 16, 1994 and defined torture as:
. any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions
(Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading
Treatment Or Punishment, 1994: 1).
The U.S. Office ofLegal Counsel agreed with this definition oftorture, but added that the
allowable pain suffered must endure over time, as long as months and years (U.S.
Department ofJustice Office ofLegal Counsel, August 1, 2002). Also, the United States
participated in and amended the UN definition of torture but was not a signatory of the
UN Convention Against Torture. Afghanistan, however, was.
Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, sent a memo to Alberto Gonzales and
William Haynes, Counsel to the President on January 22, 2002. This memo stated that
members ofthe Taliban and Al-Qaeda were not, by definition, prisoners of war but
"unlawful combatants," therefore the Geneva Conventions would not apply to them
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(Bybee, January 22, 2002). Discussion continued on the suspension of the Geneva
Conventions for the "war" with Afghanistan. William Taft, a legal advisor to the
Department of State, stated in a memo that the suspension of the Geneva Conventions
would only provoke more danger for U.S. soldiers in the present war as well as future
wars (Taft, February 2, 2002). Taft reported that the United States was showing the rest
of the world how to avoid following the Geneva Conventions.
As another source for standards of interrogation procedures, the Department of
Defense used Army Field Manual 34-52. Manual 34-52 outlined 1 7 techniques approved
for use while interrogating prisoners of war, which coincided with the treatment of
prisoners of war as outlined by the Geneva Conventions. These techniques included
more aggressive techniques than the 1 7 outlined by Manual 34-52 that seem to have been
used in Afghanistan (Schlesinger, 2004). In a memo dated January 24, 2003, the
Commander Joint Task Force- 1 80 presented a list of interrogation techniques employed
in Afghanistan, several of which were not listed in Manual 34-52. The Commander Joint
Task Force-1 80 used the list as documentation that stronger techniques than those listed
in Manual 34-52 were being used.
Under Siege at Abu Ghraib: Reasons Why

Schlesinger, Fay, and the other independent investigators speculated on why these
abuses occurred. A commonly cited reason was lack of leadership and poorly articulated
policies. Fay (2004), for example, found that "Ml personnel were also found not to have
fully comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and
regulations. Theater Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies were found to be
poorly defined, and changed several times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes
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crossed into abusive activity. . . " (p. 110). Fay's report indicated that even when the
abuses were brought to the attention ofleaders stationed at Abu Ghraib, nothing was
done to stop or prevent them. Fifty-four (54) MI, MP, medical soldiers and civilian
contractors were found responsible to some extent: 27 of them were accused of some
degree of responsibility while an additional seventeen were accused ofmisunderstanding
procedure (Fay, 2004).
Contributing to the lack ofaccountability at Abu Ghraib was the presence ofthe
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Fay reported that the CIA often gave the soldiers at
Abu Ghraib the impression that the CIA had the authority to act outside protocols and
procedures for interrogations. The CIA also housed "ghost detainees" at Abu Ghraib.
Ghost detainees were prisoners who were kept secretly at Abu Ghraib. The purpose of
secretly holding these detainees was so that the CIA staff members would not have to
follow procedures when interrogating these detainees because if no one knew where they
were, no one was held accountable for what was being done to them (Fay, 2004).
Schlesinger (2004) stated in his report that appropriate training, leadership, and
supervision could have prevented the abuses at Abu Ghraib. He located the problem in
the individual perpetrators. Schlesinger (2004) reported, "Though acts of abuse occurred
at a number of locations, those in Cell Block I have a unique nature fostered by the
predilections ofthe noncommissioned [subordinate] officers in charge. Had these
noncommissioned officers behaved more like those on the day shift, these acts, which
one participant described as 'lust for the fun ofit,' would not have taken place" (pp. 1314). Whereas Fay and Schlesinger are independent investigators, the causes they identify
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for the Abu Ghraib torture do not indict an entire system or policy. Rather, they focus on
individuals and supervision of individuals.
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IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Foundational Theories
Ronald Crelinsten's (2003) alternate reality theory provides the primary
theoretical framework of my thesis. In this section I detail his work. But first I would
like to touch on two theories that are relevant to my analysis as well. Gresham Sykes and
David Matza (1957) offered ''techniques of neutralization" in an attempt to explain
deviance ofjuveniles on an individual level. Sykes and Matza (1957) state, "We would
argue that techniques of neutralization are critical in lessening the effectiveness of social
controls . . . " (p. 669). Sykes and Matza's five techniques of neutralization are: denial of
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation of the condemners, and
appeal to higher loyalties. Denial of responsibility has offenders stating that they are not
at fault. Denial of injury is the lack of recognition by offenders that anyone was harmed
physically or emotionally by their actions. Denial of victim is similar to the denial of
injury because it is also the lack of recognition that there was a victim, or that the victim
was blameless. This technique is seen frequently in the justification of white collar crime
(Benson, 1985). The technique of condemning the condemners is a shifting of focus
from the offenders' actions to the motives or actions of the people condemning them.
Finally, the appeal to higher loyalties occurs when the offenders state that their actions
serve a higher purpose.
The second theory I would like to briefly describe is Travis Hirschi's ( 1 969)
control theory. Although not all of Hirschi's theory is relevant to my thesis, he and
Crelinsten (2003) make similar assumptions concerning a common belief system.
Hirschi ( 1969) states, "The control theory assumes the existence of a common value
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system within the society or group whose norms are being violated . . . The question is,
' Why does a man violate the rules in which he believes?' It is not, ' Why do men differ in
their beliefs about what constitutes good and desirable conduct'?" (p. 23). This theme of
a common belief system temporarily abandoned for another belief is something
Crelinsten also addresses (see The Creation ofan Alternate Reality), as do Sykes and
Matza (1 957). Like Sykes and Matza (1957), Hirschi (1969) applies his theory to
juvenile delinquency, while Crelinsten (2003) takes a broader approach, examining the
creation of alternate realities at the level of aggregates, including nations.
My Contribution
Having reviewed the historical context and the abuses that occurred at Abu
Ghraib, I will engage in a sociological analysis on how the abuses could occur.
Crelinsten's (2003) explanation of torture as a constructed alternate reality assists me in
this project. Crelinsten's theoretical framework makes a contribution in pursuing an
explanation of an often disregarded crime construct-torture.
By tradition, criminological theories tend to explain conventional crimes, such as
assault, rape, burglary, not torture. Torture can encompass assault, rape, and even
murder. Further, torture is typically commissioned by aggregates and criminologists
have not tended to explain the behavior of aggregates. Whereas mid-century
criminologists attended to gang behavior (Miller, 1958; Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin,
1960), criminological theories have not generally examined behaviors perpetrated by
groups of high social status. Aggregates with power can maintain power by withholding
information, and lack of information would certainly inhibit research. Inspired by
Crelinsten (2003), however, my research considers how aggregates can establish the
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conditions for an alternate reality that includes torture. In the next section I will clarify
Crelinsten's theory.
The Cre ation of an Alternate Reality
Crelinsten takes as a given-that most people believe that harming another person
is generally bad. As already mentioned, this is a premise Crelinsten shares with control
theorist Travis Hirschi (1 969) as well as Sykes and Matza ( 1 957). Crelinsten states,
however, that there are circumstances when most people can justify the harm inflicted on
another person. The most obvious example of this concept according to Crelinsten is that
of just war. Some wars are deemed as just insofar as they are allegedly fought to protect
the basic rights of humans. World War II is a good example of just war logic. The
United States entered World War II as a response to the Japanese invasion of Pearl
Harbor in 1 941 . Japan was considered a part of the Axis Power with Germany and Italy.
France, the United States, Great Britain and Russia, formed the Allied Powers to fight
against the Axis Powers. The Allied Powers, led by the United States, dropped two
bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. While these bombs inflicted death and long
term damage to Japan, they were perceived by most Allied Power sympathizers as
serving a part of a just cause: retribution. In the abstract, people may view violence as
wrong, but once there is the perception that this harm could be serving a greater good, an
alternate reality is created to include some use of harm. This phenomenon is akin to
Sykes and Matza's ( 1 957) appeal to higher loyalties.
More generally, Crelinsten argues that torture is only possible because people
create alternate realities in which torture is either accepted or permitted by ambivalence
and/or ignorance. Crelinsten (2003) states, "This passivity [of torture] or silent
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acquiescence on the part of the larger society allows the reality construction to spread
into more· and more spheres of political and social life until it is sufficiently anchored in
law, custom and discourse to define what is right and wrong, what is permissible and
what is not" (p. 303).
Crelinsten lists the specific processes of perpetrators to maintain an alternate
reality: authorization, routinization and dehumanization. I will focus on perpetrators and
proceed to discuss the three main processes by which perpetrators create alternate
realities.
Three Processes ofAlternate Realities
Authorization

Authorization, in Crelinsten's (2003) model, consists of the "explicit orders,
implicit encouragement or tacit approval by those in authority to commit torture" (p.
300). When people perceive that they have received authorization by someone in a
position of authority to commit a behavior outside of societal norms, such as torture, then
they are relieved from making personal judgments or decisions. This aspect of
Crelinsten's framework resembles Sykes and Matza's (1957) techniques of
neutralization, denial of responsibility.
Martha Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip Zimbardo (2002) refer to a
similar process that of moral disengagement. In Violence Workers (2002), Huggins, et al.
(2002) interviewed 23 Brazilian policemen who were either direct perpetrators or indirect
facilitators of state-sanctioned violence, to understand and reconstruct social memory.
Huggins, et al.'s (2002) concept of moral disengagement occurred when the police
officers were able to separate themselves morally from the torture that they committed.
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In their study of torture by Brazilian police, Huggins, et al. refer to authorization
as "blind obedience." While this is stronger language than Crelinsten used, Huggins, et
al. (2002) seem to be advancing a very similar concept, as they explain, "Coercive rules
and imposed roles prescribe and limit the behavioral options of the system's operatives.
At every level in social and political hierarchies, obedience to superiors is demanded of
subordinates, with subordinates in turn demanding it of those beneath them" (p. 251).
Although Crelinsten's (2003) and Huggins, et al.'s (2002) works are very similar, their
concepts may differ because Huggins, et al. specifically focused on state workers and
Crelinsten generalized his theory to apply to all governments. Blind obedience is a
fundamental aspect of military life. A soldier's life in the military is based on imposed
roles and obedience to superiors through a chain of command. I will discuss
authorization and blind obedience in terms of military life further in the analysis section.
Routinization
Crelinsten (2003) describes routinization as "[involving] the professionalization
of those who commit torture and the supplanting of conventional moral values with those
of obedience to authority and unquestioning acceptance of the regime's ideology" (p.
301). Huggins, et al. (2002) parallel Crelinsten's routinization concept with their own
that of "professionalization." They explain that professionalization includes specialized
training, division of labor, chain of command in decision making, and working protocols.
In other words, the use of torture is routinized by training individuals in particular
methods of torture, creating specific jobs to carry out torturous behavior, responding to a
set chain of responsibility for making decisions on torture, and following a protocol that
details how to carry out specific methods of torture.
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Huggins, et al. (2002) explain that the use of professionalization as a method of
routinization is effective because "it would be misleading to view torture as outside
conventional morality. One such conventional morality-professionalization-is a
modern, secular moral ethos that includes a set of principles about right and wrong in
which science and reason supposedly guide attitudes and conduct" (p. 208). The use of
professionalization reflects an image of rationality and legitimacy, and therefore seems
not so far outside of conventional morality. Although Crelinsten refers to the
"routinization" of these tactics as socializing the perpetrators of torture, the
"routinization" also characterizes in the transformation of society because it not only
involves perpetrators, but victims and bystanders as well.
Dehumanization

Dehumanization, according to Crelinsten (2003), is the creation by the perpetrator
of the perception that the victim deserves his/her fate. This process is similar to Sykes
and Matza's (1 957) denial of victim. Sykes and Matza (1 957) state, "Even if the
[perpetrator] accepts the responsibility for his deviant actions and is willing to admit that
his deviant actions involve an injury or hurt, the moral indignation of self and others may
be neutralized by an insistence that the injury is not wrong in light of the circumstances.
The injury, it may be claimed, is not really an injury; rather it is a form of rightful
retaliation or punishment" (p. 688). Because of depicted retaliation, dehumanization
occurs frequently in times of war.
Once again, I turn to Huggins, et al. (2002) for their conceptualization of
dehumanization. They write: "When people are viewed.. . as less than human-restraints
are lifted or suspended on what is permissible to do to them. We act in self-interest,
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without concern for either their feelings or lives, without concern for any societal
sanctions" (p. 255). Both Crelinsten (2003) and Huggins, et al. (2002) say that
dehumanizing victims makes it easier to perpetrate harm against them. In contrast, if
victims are seen as human, the perpetrator can relate to them and hence it is harder to
harm them.
A specific aspect ofdehumanizing victims is labeling (Huggins, et al., 2002;
Crelinsten, 2003 ; Maruna and Copes, 2005). Huggins, et al. (2002) reference Hitler's use
of labeling as dehumanization during Nazi reign. Hitler's propaganda depicted Jews and
non-Nazis as subhuman. Jews were described as "vermin" and communists were
described as "insanely destructive" (Huggins, et al., 2002). Hitler's regime was not the
- only one using subhuman propaganda to dehumanize the enemy. During World War II,
U.S. propaganda portrayed images of Japanese as rats and the Nazis as gorillas (Dower,
1 986). Although these are blatant examples of dehumanization of the victim-the victim
as presented as an animal-perhaps we have learned from that and have moved on to a
more discreet form of dehumanization: depicting the victim as simply different from us,
as we have with "enemy combatants."
Labels create an ''us versus them" mentality. Crelinsten argues that the "us versus
them" mentality is mainly disseminated by the mass media. He also states that if the
perceived enemy includes constructed classifications such as "radical extremists" or
"violent insurgents," then the threat of the enemy becomes more compelling. Crelinsten
states that the more different the ''them" is from the "us," the more believable the threat
IS.
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An example of this form of dehumanization was the 1994 Rwandan genocide
between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. The Hutus and Tutsis were actually
very similar ethnically; they both spoke the same language and followed the same
traditions. When the Belgians colonized Rwanda in 1916, however, they saw distinctions
between the two groups. The Belgians required the Hutus and Tutsis to carry
identification cards according to their ethnic dissent. The Belgians saw the Tutsis as
superior to the Hutus, and assigned privileges accordingly. Thus, the Tutsis enjoyed
better jobs and better education than the Hutus. This distinction, initiated by the
Belgians, remains to this day and was a primary contribution to the recent genocide of the
Tutsis by the Hutus. (BBC News, 2004). A memo issued by Colonel Deogratias
Nsabimana, chief of staff for the Hutu party, defined the enemy as ''the Tutsi inside or
outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power, who have NEVER recognized and
will NEVER recognize the realities of the 1959 social revolution and who wish to
reconquer power by all means necessary, including arms" [ emphasis in original
document] (Human Rights Watch, 1999: 1). Referring to the Tutsis as "extremist and
nostalgic for power," Nsabimana built on a separation between the Hutus and the Tutsis.
While the situation at Abu Ghraib was not genocide, a distinction was certainly made that
the victims were different than the perpetrators. I develop this idea further in the
analysis.
Alternate Realities in an Open Society

Crelinsten argues that in open societies, where the media go relatively uncensored
and citizens are allowed to question the government, the alternate reality must be
introduced in subtle ways, meaning gradually. He claims that people can only deny what
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they perceive and understand and if the alternate reality is introduced subtly so that no
one is able to perceive it, no one is able to question it.
Crelinsten explains that in open societies, there are certainly ambiguous areas
between the traditional reality (torture is bad) and the alternative reality (torture is
acceptable). Crelinsten's uses a metaphor to demonstrate this ambiguous area between
the original reality and the alternate reality. Crelinsten states, "One can only deny what
one is aware of in the first place. As such, there are gradations or grey areas between the
realities that sustain torture and related atrocities and those that sustain more conventional
morality" (Crelinsten, 2003 :298). Crelinsten's use of the color metaphor is symbolic of
ambiguous conditions created by the aggregate to create a climate more conducive to
torture. Crelinsten is referring to a continuum of grey areas within alternate realities. In
an open society, citizens can actively question their government, but the grey areas make
questioning more difficult.
Three Roles in the Use of Torture

Crelinsten identifies three roles in the use of torture: the perpetrators, the victims,
and the bystanders. I have focused on perpetrators, and their use of three processes to aid
in justifying the use of torture: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. Here I
briefly discuss the other two roles.
Victims at the domestic level of torture are generally minorities, disadvantaged
economically or politically or both. Crelinsten notes that if these minofities are
associated with violent insurgents or terrorism, the installation of a torturous regime is
easier because it is easier to apply the label of "enemy" to violent insurgents or terrorists.
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Crelinsten explains that the definition of the enemy by "the regime" is often broadened to
include sympathizers with the victims in the enemy category.
Finally, bys�ders aid in the construction of the alternate reality through apathy
and tolerance. Bystanders may not necessarily condone the torturous behavior but by not
openly opposing it, the alternate reality continues. Crelinsten lists three ideas with which
bystanders justify the use of torture: just world, denial, and repression. The just world
framework, described earlier, justifies the use of torture by constructing victims as
deserving this treatment. Denial is the idea that the torture would never be perpetrated
against the bystanders. Finally, repression occurs when the bystanders suppress of any
emotion related to the perpetration of torture (Crelinsten, 2003).
Fore ground and Background: The Conditions for Sharing an Alternate Re ality
Jack Katz (1 988) says that criminologists should focus on the foreground of
offending behavior rather than just the background. The foreground pertains to the
qualities of the crime while the background perta_ins to the social environment of the
perpetrators. Katz's distinction between the two is useful, and I concur that
criminologists should study both. In the case of Abu Ghraib, both the foreground and the

background were essential in facilitating conditions for the emergence of an alternate
reality. At Abu Ghraib, the foreground was the soldiers' participation in the abuses while
the background was the military and executive branch's bureaucratic acquiescence in the
abuses.
Fore ground: The Conditions for the Soldiers ' Alternate Re ality
Facilitating conditions for the production of an alternate reality were the
following three processes: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization (Crelinsten,
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2003). To believe in a successful alternate reality, the soldiers had to convince
themselves that the torture they were committing was within societal norms. Given the
classified nature of most first-person accounts, I have limited data on the verbal
neutralizations of the soldiers. I can, however, make inferences about the participation of
soldiers by interpreting how pictures of the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib eventually
became public. After committing the abuses, some of the soldiers transmitted pictures of
themselves standing with the abused victims via cell phone to family members back in
the United States.
Most of the accounts of the victims are still classified, but MSNBC, a television
news network, gained access to some of the statements released by the detainees at Abu
Ghraib. Some of the accounts given by the victims describe how the soldiers perpetrated
the torture against them. Some specifically describe the photographs taken of the abuses.
When questioned about the photographs taken of the abuses, Hiadar Sabar Abed Miktub
al-Aboodi, detainee No. 1 3077 said, "They forced us to walk like dogs on our hands and
knees. And we had to bark like a dog, and if we didn't do that they started hitting us hard
on our face and chest with no mercy. After that, they took us to our cells, took the
mattresses out and dropped water on the floor and they made us sleep on our stomachs on
the floor with the bags on our head and they took pictures of everything" (Higham and
Stephens, 2004a: 1 ).
Background: The Conditions/or the Bureaucracy 's Alternate Reality

Peter Berger and Thomas Luclcmann said, "He who has the bigger stick has the
better chance of imposing his definitions of reality" (1 966: 1 09). Bureaucracies can
condition the people under their authority to participate in the realities that they create
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(Weber, 192111968). Crelinsten explains that the imposition ofa bureaucracy's
definitions ofreality can occur both gradually and suddenly, but it is more likely that a
gradual implementation ofthe conditions ofan alternate reality will go unquestioned.
Bureaucracies as aggregates neutralize through the same processes that individuals do:
authorization, routinization, and dehumanization (Crelinsten, 2003). Bureaucracies,
however, bear a somewhat different relationship to these processes. Generally,
bureaucracies direct these processes by setting policies. Ifframed in vague or ambiguous
language, bureaucracies convey tolerance for harmful conduct that is not explicitly
named as forbidden (Weber, 1921/1968). In the analysis, I address both the foreground
and the background facilitating conditions of an alternate reality.
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·V. ANALYSIS
Introduction
This project is exemplary, not exhaustive. It serves as a demonstration of a part
of Crelinsten's framework that is evident in the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Since alternative
realities are abstract, arguably no one can ascertain that they exist. We can, however,
determine if facilitating conditions exist. I demonstrate some particular aspects of the
Abu Ghraib abuses and relate them to Crelinsten's (2003) conditions for torture.
Specific examples of the conditions conducive to the creation of an alternate
reality are organized according to two types of perpetrators: the soldiers and the
bureaucracy. As discussed previously, these two perpetrator groups correspond with a
"foreground" and a "background" of torture at Abu Ghraib.
Fore ground: The Soldiers as Perpetrators
Authorization

Recall that the authorization of torture is the explicit order or at least official
tolerance of acts of torture. Indeed, at Abu Ghraib, the soldiers were responding to the
authorization from their superior officers to interrogate the "unlawful combatants" in an
aggressive manner.
Harvey J. Volzer, attorney for Meghan Ambuhl, a soldier who was accused of
participating in the abuses, stated, "If you're there, you're going to see what's going on. If
you're Private England or these two specialists, what in the hell are you supposed to do?
You know that Military Intelligence is telling the people above you what to do" (Scelfo,
2004:1 ). Taking Volzer as a representative or proxy for Ambuhl, Volzer's statement
reflects Sykes and Matza's (1 957) neutralization technique, denial of responsibility.
37

Sykes and Matza (1 957) explained this technique as the process of transferring
responsibility onto someone or something else. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the soldiers
denied responsibility to the extent that stated that they were obeying orders from their
commanding officers. This technique of neutralization coincides with Crelinsten's
(2003) authorization process because the denial of responsibility often refers to obeying
orders from a person perceived to be in authority.
Private Lynndie England, a better known female soldier accused of abusing
detainees, stated, "I was instructed by persons in higher rank to stand there and hold this
leash and look at the camera," in reference to the photographs taken of her standing next
to a leashed detainee (CBS/AP, 2004:1 ). England also stated, "To all of us who have
been charged, we all agree that we don't feel like we were doing things that we weren't
supposed to, because we were told to do them. We think everything was justified,
because we were instructed to do this and to do that" (CBS/AP, 2004:1). Similar to
Volzer, England indicated that she was obedient to those in authority.
Some of the soldiers perceived silence from the administration on interrogation
tactics as authorization to use some tactics that were actually never approved. For
example, Specialist Sabrina D. Harman, a soldier accused of photographing and
participating in the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib, said. that she was never informed
about the Geneva Conventions and what they stated regarding the humane treatment of
detainees. Harman was quoted by The Washington Post as stating, "The Geneva
Conventions were never posted, and none of us remember taking a class to review it. The
first time reading it was two months after being charged" (Spinner, 2004: A0 l }. Harman
was effectively allowed to participate in torturous behavior because she was unaware that
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the United States was bound by international law to treat detainees humanely in all
circumstances-a commitment that Rumsfeld had reaffirmed symbolically in a memo to
be distributed to military personnel on April 16, 2003. Her attention to only what was
explicitly instructed or prohibited of her reflects the foundation of torture in
"authorization."
Private Charles Graner stated his perception that the abuses were authorized
through orders he received from commanding officers. During his trial, Graner stated
that his lieutenant told him, "If [military intelligence] asks you to do this, it needs to be
done. They're in charge, follow their orders ... At the time my understanding is that they
[the treatment of the detainees] were [lawful], or I wouldn't have done them" (Graner,
2005: 1). By telling Graner not to question the authority of commanding officers even if
what they were suggesting seemed wrong to Graner, the lieutenant "authorized" him to
submit to those with perceived power.
Routinization

Recall that routinization is the professionalization of the people who commit
torture. Journalist Seymour Hersh reported that Sergeant Javal Davis, a soldier accused
of abuse, did question the abuses but the response he received was that this was the
proper manner in which to handle the detainees. Hersh quoted Davis as stating, "I
witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section... being made to do various things that I
would question morally ... We were told that they had different rules . . . The MI staffs to
my understanding have been giving Graner compliments. . . statements like, 'Good job,
they're breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They're giving out good
information" (Hersh, April 30, 2004:1). This affirmation is an example of routinization
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because a system of rewards and punishments condition the perpetrators to continue the
torture (Crelinsten, 2003:301 ). Davis perceived that Graner was receiving affirmation
that his treatment of the detainees was not only authorized but encouraged.
When he was questioned as to why he did not report the abuses that he allegedly
thought were "morally" wrong, Dayis replied, "Because I assumed that if they were
doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said
something. Also the wing [where the abuses occurred] belongs to MI and it appeared MI
personnel approved of the abuse" (Hersh, April 30, 2004:1 ). In the wing where the
abuses occurred, MI supposedly was in control and therefore controlled what behavior
was appropriate with the detainees.
As mentioned earlier, routinization can also be seen in the division of labor as
legitimatizing the use of torture. In the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, some
soldiers would gather the victims, some would place them on the train, some would take
them to the "showers" to be executed, would collect the shoes from the bodies, and some
would take the bodies to the incinerator (Bamavi, 1992). This division of labor created a
separation between the perpetrator and the system of torture. It is an example of
Huggins, et al.'s (2002) concept, the professionalization of torture. While Abu Ghraib
was not a concentration camp, there was a division of labor between the Military
Intelligence (MI) and the Military Police (MP).
At Abu Ghraib, the MPs were in charge of guarding the detainees while the Mis
were in charge of interrogating them. For example, Private Lynndie England told
investigators, "MI had told us to 'rough them' up to get answers from the prisoners"
(Higham and Stephens, 2004b: 1 ). Stephanie Harman, another soldier accused of abuses
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at Abu Ghraib, stated in a sworn statement, "It is [Graner] and Frederick's job to do
things for MI and OGA [other government agencies] to get these people to talk" (Fuoco,
et al., May 8, 2004: 1). While no guidelines exist outlining the protocol for MP and MI
relationships within a MP detention facility, there was a clear division of labor between
the two groups (Schlesinger, 2004). The division oflabor, as a part of the process of
routinization, allowed the soldiers to separate themselves from the system of torture.
To military personnel, war is a legitimized event. In other words, a soldier's job
description might include fighting in a war. War itself.-and all that it might entail-is
professionalized. An example ofthis process is found in Private Lynndie England's
explanation as to why she participated in the abuses. She told a reporter, "I guess it just
goes with stuff that happens during war time ... You know, going in and interrogating, and
doing what you're told." England emphasized the fact that the abusive behavior occurred
within the confines of war. Since the abuses occurred during wartime, they are more
easily justified than if they had occurred during peacetime.
Dehumanization

As discussed earlier, modem history reflects a shift away from dehumanizing by
referring to the victim as subhuman to referring to the victim as different than the
perpetrators. Recall, Crelinsten (2003) refers to this as an ''us versus them" mentality.
Perhaps President Bush set the precedent for separating "us" from "them" in his
address to the nation of the eve of declaring the "War on Terror." He stated, "The
enemies you confront will come to know your skill and bravery. The people you liberate
will witness the honorable and decent spirit ofthe American military. In this conflict,
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions ofwar or rules of morality"
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(2003: 1 ). By appealing first to the "skill and bravery" and the "honorable and decent
spirit" of the American military, President Bush established that the American military is
collectively a morally good entity. He then refers to the enemy "who has no regard for
the conventions of war or rules of morality." In this statement Bush implies that while
the American military is moral, the enemies that it is fighting are not.
For another example of the "us/them" mentality (Crelinsten, 2003), recall
President Bush's statement cited in the sub-section, A New Kind of War. Bush referred to
starkly opposing differences between the American and the Iraqi ideologies. He stated
that Hussein's mindset was that of "tyranny and murder" while the American mindset
was of "liberty and life" (Bush, May 24, 2004). By emphasizing the difference between
the two ideologies, a separation was created between us and them.
When referring to the detainees who were being held at Abu Ghraib, Guy
Womack, Charles Graner's attorney, said that they were "not just some guys you find
standing out front of a Dairy Queen" (Kirsch, January 12, 2005:1 ). By this statement,
Womack, on behalf of Graner, distanced the victims from the perpetrators. If the victims
had been "guys you find standing out front of a Dairy Queen" it would have been more
difficult, or less defensible, to torture them because Graner could have related to them
more easily. Like Bush's statement regarding the enemy being immoral, Womack's
statement created distance between the perpetrators and the victims. The separation of
the perpetrator from the victim allows for a denial of victim (Sykes and Matza, 1 957) to
occur.
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Background: The Bureaucracy as Perpetrators
The same three key processes ·apply to the bureaucracy as the perpetrator:
authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. In this case, the bureaucracy is the
American government and military command. Recall that the background consists of the
social environment of the perpetrators (Katz, 1988). The bureaucracy acts as the social
environment by creating an atmosphere conducive to torture.
Authorization

Tables 1 -3 give the chronological order that interrogation techniques were
authorized at Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. After reviewing the order of
authorization, it will be easier to examine how the authorization of the interrogation
tactics contributed to the conditions necessary for the creation of an alternate reality.
As shown in Tables 1 through 3, the interrogation techniques authorized at Guantanamo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq all initially followed Field Manual 34-52 exclusively. Field
Manual 34-52 provides military guidelines for interrogation procedures last updated in
1992 (Jacques, 2005). While Field Manual 34-52 has been widely used and accepted as
an appropriate set of guidelines, it does not list specific authorized techniques. Rather, it
addresses in a more general manner the behaviors expected and not expected from
interrogators. Field Manual 34-52 strongly discourages the use of physical force to
obtain information from prisoners. The manual states, "The use of force, mental torture,
threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is
prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the U.S. Government.
Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of

43

· Table 1 : INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR GUANTANAMO BAY (2002)
Date
Effective
Protocol
Authorized
By:
Description

January 2002

December 2, 2002

Field Manual 34-52
Anny Protocol

Category II and III techniques
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out explicit interrogation
techniques, the manual uses more general suggestions in
interrogation prisoners. Field Manual 34-52 states,
"The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to
unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by
law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the U.S.
Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not
necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation.
Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields
unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and
can induce the source to say whatever he thin.ks the interrogator
wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused
with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and
noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant
or uncooperative sources.
The psychological techniques and principles outlined should
neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with,
unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or
any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These
techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in
obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of
threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and
use normally constitute violations of international law and may
result in prosecution under the UCMJ.
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or
force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source
challenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral
viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law,
agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and
deprivation useless as interrogation techniques" (1 992, Chapter
1 :2)

Category II:
(1) The use of stress positions (like
standing) for a maximum of four
hours.
(2) The use of falsified documents or
reports.
(3) Use of the isolation facility for up
to 30 days. Request must be made
through the OIC [Officer In Charge],
Interrogation Section, to the Director,
Joint Interrogation Group (JIG).
Extensions beyond the initial 30 days
must be approved by
Commanding General. For selected
detainees, the OIC, Interrogation
Section, will approve all contacts with
the detainee, to include medical visits
of a non-emergent nature.
(4) Interrogating the detainee in an
environment other than the standard
interrogation booth.
(5) Deprivation of light and auditory
stimuli.
(6) The detainee may also have a hood
placed over his head during
transportation and questioning. The
hood shall not restrict breathing in any
way and the detainee should be under
direct observation when hooded.
(7) The use of 20-hour interrogations.
(8) Removal of all comfort items
(including religious items).
(9) Switching the detainees from hot
rations to MREs.
(10) Removal of clothing.
( 1 1) Forced grooming (shaving of
facial hair, etc.).
(12) Using detainees' individual
phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce
stress (Phifer, October 1 1 , 2002:2).
Category Ill:
"The use of mild, non-injurious
physical contact such as grabbing,
poking in the chest with the finger, and
light pushing" (Haynes, November 27,
2002: 1)
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Date
Effective
Protocol

January IS, 2003

Authorized

Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld
Category II and III techniques
were rescinded on the advice of
General Counsel of the
Department of the Navy, Alberto
J. Mora

By:

Description

Category II and Ill techniques

Table 1 (cont.)
March 6, 2003

April 1 6, 2003

35 Revised techniques
submitted to Rumsfeld for
approval
U.S. Air Force Commander
General Counsel MarY Walker
( I ) Direct
(2) Incentive/Removal of
Incentive
(3) Emotional Love
(4) Emotional hate
(S) Fear Up Harsh
(6) Fear Up Mild
(7) Reduced Fear
(8) Pride and Ego Up
(9) Pride and Ego Down
( 10) Futility
(1 1) We Know All
(12) Establish Your Identity
( 1 3) Repetition Approach
(14) File and Dossier
(15) Mutt and Jeff
(16) Rapid Fire
(17) Silence
( 18) Change of Scenery Up
( 19) Change of Scenery Down
(20) Hooding
(2 1) Mild Physical Contact
(22) Dietary Manipulation
(23) Environmental
Manipulation
(24) Sleep Adjustment
(25) False Flag
(26) Threat of Transfer
(27) Isolation
(28) Use of Prolonged
Interrogations
(29) Forced Grooming
(30) Prolonged Standing
(3 1) Sleep Deprivation
(32) Physical Training
(33) Face Slap/Stomach Slap
(34) Removal of Clothing
(35) Increasing Anxiety by
Use of Aversions
(Walker, 2003:7 1-73)

24 of 35 accepted
techniques
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Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld
(I) Direct
(2) Incentive/Removal of
Incentive
(3) Emotional Love
(4) Emotional hate
(S) Fear Up Harsh
(6) Fear Up Mild
(7) Reduced Fear
(8) Pride and Ego Up
(9) Pride and Ego Down
( 1 0) Futility
(1 1) We Know All
( 1 2) Establish Your
Identity
( 13) Repetition Approach
(14) File and Dossier
(15) Mutt and Jeff
(16) Rapid Fire
(17) Silence
( 1 8) Change of Scenery Up
(19) Change of Scenery
Down
(20) Dietary Manipulation
(2 1) Environmental
Manipulation
(22) Sleep Adjustment
(23) False Flag
(24) Isolation
(Rumsfeld, 2003: 1-2)

Tabl� 2 : INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR AFGHANISTAN
(2001-2003)

Date Effective
Protocol

October 200 1-December 2002
Field Manual 34-52

January 24, 2003
Category II and III
techniques

Authorized
By:

Anny Protocol

Description

While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out
explicit interrogation techniques, the
manual uses more general suggestions in
interrogation prisoners. Field Manual 3452 states,
"The use of force, mental torture, threats,
insults, or exposure to unpleasant and
inhumane treatment of any kind is
prohibited by law and is neither authorized
nor condoned by the U.S. Government.
Experience indicates that the use of force
is not necessary to gain the cooperation of
sources for interrogation. Therefore, the
use of force is a poor technique, as it yields
unreliable results, may damage subsequent
collection efforts, and can induce the
source to say whatever he thinks the
interrogator wants to hear. However, the
use of force is not to be confused with
psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or
other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses
used by the interrogator in questioning
hesitant or uncooperative sources.
The psychological techniques and
principles outlined should neither be
confused with, nor construed to .be
synonymous with, unauthorized techniques
such as brainwashing, mental torture, or
any other form of mental coercion to
include drugs. These techniques and
principles are intended to serve as guides
in obtaining the willing cooperation of a
source. The absence of threats in
interrogation is intentional, as their
enforcement and use normally constitute
violations of international law and may
result in prosecution under the U CMJ.
Additionally, the inability to carry out a
threat of violence or force renders an
interrogator ineffective should the source
challenge the threat. Consequently, from
both legal and moral viewpoints, the
restrictions established by international
law, agreements, and customs render
threats of force, violence, and deprivation
useless as interrogation techniques" ( 1992,
Chapter I :2)

CJTF- 1 80 Acting
Staff Judge
Advocate
The CJTF- 1 80
Acting Staff Judge
Advocate drafted a
memorandum that
was sent to
CENTCOM Staff
Judge Advocate
outlining the
interrogation
techniques in
practice in
Afghanistan.
According to the
Executive Summary
by the Department
of Defense (2005),
these techniques
closely resembled
those techniques
listed in the
December 2, 2002
memo regarding the
Category II and III
techniques
employed at
Guantanamo.
Recall, these were
later rescinded by
Rumsfeld.
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February 27, 2003
Revision of five
techniques not consistent
with Field Manual 34-52
CJTF-1 80 Commander,
Lieutenant General Dan K.
McNeil
This memo addressed five
techniques (the specifics
are still classified) that
were believed to be
involved in 2 detainee
deaths in December 2002.
These five techniques were
either modified or
eliminated as a
precautionary action
(Jacques, 2005).

Date
Effective
Protocol
Authorized

By:

Description

March 2004

Table 2 (cont.)
June 2004

Revised interrogation techniques
CJTF- 1 80

Field Manual 34-52
CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid

According to the Department of
Defense's Executive Summary, these
revised guidelines revived some of the
techniques that had previously been
rescinded on February 27, 2003.
Additionally, "Some of techniques in the
new guidance were based upon an
unsigned draft memorandum from the
Secretary of Defense to CENTCOM
(prepared by the Joint Staff) that was
substantively identical to the Secretary's
April 1 6, 2003 interrogation policy for
GTMO" (2005 :7).

General Abizaid ordered that all interrogations techniques be
standardized to one policy. The policy adopted relies nearly
exclusively on the procedures laid out by Field Manual 34-52
(Jacques, 2005).
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Date
Effective
Protocol

Table 3: INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR IRAQ,
INCLUDING ABU GRHAIB (2003-Present)
March 1 9, 2003

September 14,
2003
CJTF-7
Interrogation
policy for Iraq

Field Manual 34-52

Authorized
By:

Army Protocol

Description

While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out
explicit interrogation techniques, the manual
uses more general suggestions in interrogation
prisoners. Field Manual 34-52 states,
"The use of force, mental torture, threats,
insults, or exposure to unpleasant and
inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited
by law and is neither authorized nor condoned
by the U.S. Government. Experience
indicates that the use of force is not necessary
to gain the cooperation of sources for
interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a
poor technique, as it yields unreliable results,
may damage subsequent collection efforts,
and can induce the source to say whatever he
thinks the interrogator wants to hear.
However, the use of force is not to be
confused with psychological ploys, verbal
trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive
ruses used by the interrogator in questioning
hesitant or uncooperative sources.
The psychological techniques and principles
outlined should neither be confused with, nor
construed to be synonymous with,
unauthorized techniques such as
brainwashing, mental torture, or any other
form of mental coercion to include drugs.
These techniques and principles are intended
to serve as guides in obtaining the willing
cooperation of a source. The absence of
threats in interrogation is intentional, as their
enforcement and use normally constitute
violations of international law and may result
in prosecution under the UCMJ.
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat
of violence or force renders an interrogator
ineffective should the source challenge the
threat. Consequently, from both legal and
moral viewpoints, the restrictions established
by international law, agreements, and customs
render threats of force, violence, and
deprivation useless as interrogation
techniques" ( 1 992, Chapter 1 :2)
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CJTF-7
Commander,
Lieutenant
General Ricardo
Sanchez
The CJTF-7
interrogation
policy was
heavily
influenced by the
April 1 6, 2003
memo which
outlined
interrogation
techniques to be
used at
Guantanamo
Bay. This memo
was brought to
Iraq by Military
General Miller
on a visit. This
policy also
included some
techniques being
employed in
Afghanistan
(Jacques, 2005).

October 1 2, 2003
Revision of
CJTF-7
Interrogation
oolicv for Irao
CENTCOM's
Staff Judge
Advocate
The
CENTCOM's
Staff Judge
Advocate
reviewed the
policy as drafted
by Lieutenant
General Ricardo
Sanchez and
found it "overly
aggressive"
(Jacques,

2005:8). After
the revisions, the
policy closely
resembled
guidelines
outlined in Field
Manual 34-52.
The Department
of Defense's
Executive
Summary stated,
"It should be
noted that none
of the techniques
contained in
either the
September or
October 2003
CJTF-7
interrogation
policies would
have permitted
abuses such as
those at Abu
Ghraib"
(2005:8).

May 13, 2004
to Present
Revision of
CJTF-7
Interrogation
oolicv for Iraq
CJTF-7

According to
the Executive
Summary of
the
Department of
Defense was,
"The list of
approved
techniques
remained
identical to the
October 2003
policy; the
principal
change from
the previous
policy was to
specify that
under no
circumstances
would requests
for the use of
certain
techniques be
approved"
(2005 :8).

sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields
unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source
to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear" (1 992:2). The Manual
discourages use of force for instrumental reasons, and not because it is wrong per se.
Because Field Manual 34-52 only provided general guidelines for interrogating
detainees rather than specific protocols, the interrogation techniques used at all three
locations- Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq-were open to the interpretation of
commanding officers (Jacques, 2005). This ambiguity would present a problem in an
environment as highly structured as the military. Because protocol exists for almost
every behavior in the military, Field Manual 34-52, which was open to interpretation,
would cause confusion and prompted creative techniques perceived as legitimate
according to the Manual. Indeed, in the Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review
Department ofDefense Detention Operations, Chairman James R. Schlesinger (2004)
stated, "The policy memos promulgated at the CJTF-7 level allowed for interpretation in
several areas and did not adequately set forth the limits of interrogation techniques. The
existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies contributed to the
belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned" (p. 9).
Another example of authorization as a condition of the creation of an alternate
reality was when Rumsfeld briefly authorized the use of Category II and III techniques in
Afghanistan on January 24, 2003. Although these techniques of interrogation were later
found to be in violation of Field Manual 34-52 and thus rescinded, the authorization of
these techniques at all, even if it was only for a few weeks, led soldiers to believe that
these techniques were approved.
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The Tables clearly show that the interrogation techniques were revised several
times, often within a very short period of time. For example, there was a significant shift
in less than a month's time of interrogation techniques approved by Rumsfeld (Table 3,
September 1 4, 2003 and October 1 2, 2003). The frequent revisions added to the
confusion of what techniques were authorized at any particular time. Even though the
Department of Defense' s summary said that frequent revision to the approved
interrogation techniques did not cause the abuses suffered at Abu Ghraib (Jacques, 2005),
Fay's (2004) report indicted the frequency of revisions by stating, "Theater Interrogation
and Counter-Resistance Policies were found to be poorly defined, and changed several
times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes crossed into abusive activity . . . " (p.
1 1 0). Fay's explanation of why the abuses occurred coincides with Crelinsten' s
framework regarding authorization as a condition of the creation of an alternate reality.
The Abu Ghraib example extends Crelinsten' s discussion, however, in highlighting the
role of inconsistent authorization. Inconsistency can be taken as authorization itself.
Routinization
Recall that Crelinsten refers to routinization as the professionalization of those
who commit torture and the routine occurrence of torture so that it is normalized. For
example, consider the terminology used for the detainees. President Bush and his
advisors decided that members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda were "unlawful combatants"
and would not be considered prisoners of war. The terminology prevented the detainees
from receiving rights outlined in the Geneva Conventions for prisoners of war
(Schlesinger, 2004).
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Because the term "unlawful combatant" had never been officially used in any
other war before, no protocol existed on how to treat the unlawful combatants. Because
of the new terminology, the bureaucracy purportedly had to establish new protocol for
how to treat unlawful combatants. The routine referral of the detainees as unlawful
combatants created the condition of routinization as explained by Crelinsten, especially in
open societies, such as the United States, where the conditions for the creation of an
alternate reality must occur subtly and in complex ways.
Ambiguous or vague language by the bureaucracy also enabled "transcendence"
from generally held norms (Hastings and Vernon, 1971). For example, recall that
Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in regard to treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay,
"I reiterate that U.S. Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the
extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the
principles of the Geneva Conventions" (Rumsfeld, April 16, 2003: 1). When he used the
expressions, "to the extent appropriate" and "military necessity," Rumsfeld indicated that
the soldiers would have to use some discretion on what that "extent" and that "necessity"
were. If no one knew precisely what was meant by these terms, they were open to
interpretation.
Additionally, and more generally, when a bureaucracy professionalizes the use of
torture through policies, training, and regulations, the process is perceived by the
perpetrators as authorized and therefore legitimated by bureaucratic norms (Huggins, et
al., 2002). The policies authorized by Rumsfeld and other military officials
professionalized the more aggressive techniques. While some of the interrogation
techniques were rescinded, they were in effect for a short period of time during which
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they were used on detainees. The routine authorization ofmore aggressive interrogation
techniques conditioned the soldiers to perceive the techniques as authorized and
acceptable, and therefore led to minimal challenging of them.
Dehumanization

Similar to the dehumanization techniques employed by the soldiers, the
bureaucracy as an aggregate also works to dehumanize the enemy. An example of
dehumanization in the context of Abu Ghraib was the bureaucracy's use of the term
"unlawful combatant" instead of prisoner of war (Schlesinger, 2004). Since members of
the Taliban and Al Qaeda were considered "unlawful combatants" instead of "prisoners
of war," President Bush and his advisors determined that they were not necessarily
entitled to the humane treatment outlined in the Geneva Conventions specifically for
prisoners of war (Schlesinger, 2004). A semantic change paved the way for a policy
change.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Discussion
Inspired by Crelinsten (2003) framework, I have examined the facilitating
conditions that would produce an alternate reality conducive to torture. Both the soldiers
and the bureaucracy-that is, the military leaders and executive branch of the United
States--participated as perpetrators at Abu Ghraib through authorization, routinization,
and dehumanization. Hopefully, by recognizing the processes of the construction of an
alternate reality that includes torture, we can prevent torture in the future.
The prevention of torture requires the deconstruction of the alternate reality by all
those involved in its sphere of influence, the perpetrators, victims and bystanders. It
occurs when people recognize that there is an alternate reality and can stop the spread of
its influence.
A factor contributing to the creation of an alternate reality which includes torture
can involve the enlarging of who is considered the enemy. Enlarging the enemy simply
means broadening the scope of who is considered the enemy. Huggins, et al. (2002)
gives an example in their book Violence Workers. In reference to the training process of
Brazilian police, they explain that the police cadets' instructors tell them that danger is
ubiquitous such that their enemy can literally be anyone. This technique caused the
police officers to be skeptical of everyone.
John Jacques (2005) refers to the enlargement of the enemy in the Department of
Defense's Executive Summary in its discussion of gaining intelligence through
interrogations by stating, "Human intelligence, or HUMINT - of which interrogation is
an indispensable component - has taken on increasing importance as we face an enemy
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that blends in with the civilian population and operates in the shadows" (p. 1). This type
of rhetoric implies that the enemy could be anyone, not just terrorists. Jacques' statement
that the enemy "blends in with the civilian population" clearly broadens the scope of who
is considered the enemy. Recognizing that the enlargement of enemies is occurring and
stopping the spread of its influence is one step in preventing torture.
Critique

Crelinsten's (2003) framework is derivative, though not explicitly so, of other
sociological schemes. Crelinsten's sociological forbears provided tools for understanding
the conditions conducive to the creation of a shared reality that includes torture. With an
eye toward preventing, we would do well to turn to more specific theories focusing on the
construction of bureaucracies (Weber, 1921/1968). Even though Weber does not address
torture, often torture is state-sanctioned and therefore a look into how bureaucracies work
would help in understanding the inclusion of torture by a bureaucracy.
An examination of the body of literature on the "Just World Hypothesis" (Lerner,
198 1) would prove fruitful in evaluating how some people believe that torture is justified
because the victims somehow deserve this treatment. The Just World Hypothesis helps
people believe that the world makes sense, which Lerner ( 198 1) implies is universal. Yet
it remains the case that in many circumstances many people do not justify mistreatment
on deserving grounds. What are those conditions? It behooves us to ask.
On a micro level, we would do well to tum to Sykes and Matza' s ( 1957)
techniques of neutralization. While Crelinsten's (2003) framework focuses on a macro
explanation of how torture occurs, Sykes and Matza offer a theory for how individuals
neutralize deviant behavior. Sykes and Matza do not specifically address torture, but I
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think that their framework would be useful for impeding the neutralization of torture (see
Maruna and Copes [2005] for a recent review).
I was attracted to Crelin�ten's (2003) framework because he was unique in his
, usage of the term torture. While most criminologists shy away from discussing torture,
Crelinsten makes a contribution to criminology by addressing how torture occurs via the
construction of alternate realities. Crelinsten's framework could have been made
stronger by referencing the body of literature by other sociologists and criminologists
who had conducted research in areas pertaining to his work (Weber, 1921/1 968; Sykes
and Matza, 1 957; Lerner, 1 981 ).
A Proposal for Future Research
Given the time parameters and the limited scope of this project, certainly much
more research could be conducted to further the application of Crelinsten's framework to
the abuses at Abu Ghraib. A large amount of data remains to be analyzed regarding the
interrogation policies of the United States, at Abu Ghraib or more generally.
As more time goes by;· more information will be released regarding the victims,
the soldiers, and the bureaucracy at Abu Ghraib. By April 1 5, 2005, there was very
limited disclosure of the statements of the victims at Abu Ghraib. I hope that future
investigations into Abu Ghraib will also reveal the testimony of the victims. These data
will enhance the application of Crelinsten's model of how and why torture occurs. After
all, without laying blame with the victims, Crelinsten ascribed them a role in an alternate
reality permitting torture.
Likewise, research can be conducted on the role of bystanders in the creation of
alternate realities. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the United Nations was a key bystander.
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The leader of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, expressed clear disagreement with
President Bush and his administration in declaring a preemptive war against Iraq. Yet,
once the United States initiated hostilities, Annan and the United Nations did not take any
action to stop the hostilities.
Also, a cross-national or cross-historical study into interrogation policies
appropriated by governments might be fruitful. Each government has different guidelines
for interrogations; therefore a comparison of interrogation techniques would be insightful
in understanding how different cultures perceive the objectives of interrogations.
Another method in understanding the evolution of interrogation techniques would be to
conduct a cross-historical study. Examining interrogation methods used throughout
history, and considering the context (for example compare the methods of interrogation
used during World War I and the most recent preemptive war with Iraq) perhaps would
be useful in understanding why particular methods are still used, no longer used, or why
new techniques are in effect.
Crelinsten's framework is broad, and there are many aspects of it that I did not
explore. I focused on the conditions that make the creation of an alternate reality
possible. Crelinsten explores not only the creation, but the consequences and cures for an
alternate reality that includes torture. Further temporal distance from Abu Ghraib will
allow future researchers to examine the consequences of Abu Ghraib as well as cures to
prevent the same type of atrocity from occurring in the future.
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